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THE SYNTHESIS PROJECT (Synthesis) is a new initiative of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
It aims to produce relevant, concise, and thought-provoking briefs and reports on today’s
important health policy issues. By synthesizing what is known, while weighing the strength
of findings and exposing gaps in knowledge, Synthesis products give decisionmakers reliable
information and new insights to inform complex policy decisions. This 16-page Research 
Synthesis Report, prepared as part of The Synthesis Project, summarizes key research on the
relationship between firm size and health insurance premiums. A related 4-page Policy Brief
presents an even more concise summary of the research on these topics. The information 
contained in both reports is available online at www.policysynthesis.org.
SYNTHESIS DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
In 2000, about one in seven people—or about 14 percent of the U.S. population—
did not have health insurance. The current economic downturn is likely to increase
this problem (18). Contrary to popular belief, fully 80 percent of the uninsured are
wage earners or members of working families.1 Most were not offered insurance
at their own or a family member’s place of employment (12).
Small firms are much less likely than large firms to offer coverage to their workers.2
In 2001, almost two-thirds of all small firms (with 3–199 employees) cited high
premiums as the reason for not offering coverage.3 Although good estimates of
premium cost differences between small and large firms (for comparable benefit
packages) are lacking, the best available evidence suggests that small firms face
higher health insurance costs for the same benefits than large firms for a variety
of reasons. 
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INTRODUCTION
1. Sixty percent are wage earners. See Institute of Medicine, 2001. Coverage Matters. Insurance and 
Health Care, p.68.
2. Almost all firms with more than 200 employees offer health insurance, but only about 60 percent of the smallest
firms (with 3–9 workers) do. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust.
Employer Health Benefits. 2001 Annual Survey, p.36. (Hereafter: KFF/HRET, 2001 Annual Survey.)
3. Sixty-four percent of all firms with under 200 employees cite high premiums as the reason for not offering 
coverage. KFF/HRET: 2001 Annual Survey, p.41.
The purpose of this synthesis is to
analyze the differences in health
insurance costs between small and
large firms. We weigh available
research findings, draw conclusions
based on those findings, and note
where the evidence on a particular
issue is lacking or inconclusive. The
synthesis draws most heavily on stud-
ies that meet professionally accepted
social scientific standards for valid and
reliable data analysis and hypothesis
testing. However, this synthesis also
evaluates some studies that are not 
as methodologically strong but have
widely influenced thinking on cost
differences by firm size.
The synthesis addresses three broad
questions. First, how do premiums
paid by small and large firms compare?
Are simple comparisons misleading? 
If so, why? Second, do administrative
costs, state mandates for benefits,
and other factors like cycling in and
out of the market, employee turnover,
and firm failure result in higher health
insurance costs for small firms than
for large firms? And third, what are
the research and policy implications
of our findings?
Note that a major challenge in
addressing these questions is the lack
of valid data on premiums (or health
plan costs) paid by firms of different
sizes. Insurers are the best potential
source of this information for fully-
insured firms, but their data generally
are proprietary. Moreover, they do
not have data on the health care costs
of firms that self-insure. In addition,
available surveys of employee benefits
do not usually obtain information on
the premiums faced by small employers
who do not offer insurance, and the
surveys’ low response rates (50 percent
or less) could limit the generalizability
of the findings if the non-responding
and responding firms differ with
respect to outcomes of interest.4 These
surveys also lack common definitions
for basic terms such as firm size and
administrative costs.
The sections that follow address these
specific questions:
Q1: Are health insurance premiums
higher for small firms?
Q2: Are offer rates different for small
and large firms?
Q3: Are the administrative costs of
health insurance higher for small
firms?
Q4: Do benefits mandated by states
increase insurance costs for small firms?
Q5: Have purchasing pools reduced
small firms’ premium costs?
Q6: What other factors might drive 
up premiums for small firms relative
to large firms?
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4. KFF and HRET have conducted an annual survey of employer health benefits since 1999. KPMG conducted the
survey from 1992 to 1998, though only large employers were sampled in three of those years. The Health Insurance
Association of America (HIAA) conducted the survey in 1990 and 1991. These are the employer surveys referred
to in the text.
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FINDINGS
Are Health Insurance Premiums 
Higher for Small Firms?
EPremium data do not reflect 
differences in covered benefits. 
Many observers believe that small firms must pay higher premiums than large
firms, and that this factor accounts for small firms’ lower propensity to offer
coverage. However, national survey data—which show that small and large 
firms pay similar premiums—challenge this view.
Q1: ARE HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS HIGHER FOR SMALL FIRMS?
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational 
Trust (KFF/HRET) conduct an annual survey of employers (called the Employer
Benefits Survey) which asks detailed questions about plan design and benefits.
The most recent survey estimated that the annual average premium for single
coverage for all small firms (3–199 employees) was $2,735 and for all large firms
(≥200 employees) was $2,610, resulting in a small cost difference of $125 (13). 
Conversely, the average annual premium for family coverage in 2001 was lower
for small firms ($6,902) compared to large firms ($7,124). 
Simple comparisons of premiums can, however, be misleading. First, there are
differences in the underlying benefit packages offered by small and large firms.
Second, simple premium comparisons do not include prices faced by firms 
that do not offer coverage. Third, average prices mask the different premium
distributions for small and large firms.
The comparison of average premiums by firm size provides no information about
the relative generosity or economy of the benefit packages purchased. Two plans
with the same premium but unequal benefits are clearly not equivalent, and 
evidence suggests that some small firms do, indeed, offer less generous benefit
packages. Drawing from the 1999 KFF/HRET survey, the General Accounting Office
(GAO) concluded that “…compared with plans offered by large employers, very
small firms paid premiums that averaged about 10 percent higher for plans that
covered fewer benefits, and required deductibles twice as high” (italics added) (8).
In October 2001, GAO reported to Congress that workers covered through small
firms are less likely to receive coverage for prescription drugs, prenatal care, out-
patient and inpatient mental health, well-baby care, adult physicals, chiropractic
care, oral contraceptives, and acupuncture (9).
Premium costs faced by firms
that do not offer coverage 
are not captured in simple 
premium comparisons.
Further, the data do not 
capture the extent of variability
in premiums for small firms.
Small firms are medically 
underwritten more frequently
than large firms.
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The KFF/HRET survey does not include small firms that did not offer insurance 
(35 percent of all firms with 3–199 employees in 2001). The premiums that insurers
quoted to these firms may have differed significantly from the premium quotes
received by firms that offered coverage. Those with high-risk work forces, for
example, may have faced considerably higher premiums than the average. Without
the full complement of data, conclusions for all small firms cannot be drawn.
A comparison of average premiums reveals nothing about the distribution of
premiums across the market for small or large firms. Although some state laws
limit the extent of premium variation, small firms might still experience more
premium variation as a group.
One cause of premium variability is medical underwriting, which is more 
common for small firms. Medical underwriting is the practice of setting a firm’s
premiums based on a calculation of expected medical costs as determined by an
assessment of the health status of enrollees. If small insurers were certain they
would attract a representative sample of enrollees from small firms, they would
not medically underwrite in the small group market. But of course, insurers have
no such guarantee. Therefore, they protect against the risk of attracting less
healthy enrollees by medically underwriting small firms. They charge healthier-than-
average firms lower premiums and less-healthy firms higher premiums (to the
extent allowable by state law).
Using the 1993 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) Employer Health Insurance
Survey, Cantor found that firms with one to four employees that offered coverage
were underwritten 42 percent of the time compared to 21 percent of the time
for firms with more than 50 employees (2). Medical underwriting increases premium
variation since it ties premium cost to expected claims. Many rating reform laws
limit medical underwriting and a small number of states prohibit it by requiring
community rating. However, where it is allowed and used, it creates more premium
variability for small firms.
Q2: ARE OFFER RATES DIFFERENT FOR SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS?
While almost all large firms (≥200 employees) offer insurance coverage, only
about 60 percent of the smallest firms (with 3–9 employees) do (13). As it turns out,
almost all high-wage small firms offer insurance (FIGURE 1). In addition, although
small and large firms differ with respect to offer rates, those that provide health
insurance have similar eligibility, take-up, and coverage rates (FIGURE 4). 
Wage rate affects small 
employers’ decision to offer 
coverage.
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E Among small firms, the decision to offer coverage is influenced by wage rates.
Schone (21) found that the likelihood of offering insurance among small firms
increases with wage rates (FIGURE 1). High-wage small firms tend to have offer
rates closer to those of large firms (both in 1987 and in 1996, when offer rates
were higher).
For single coverage, the average annual premium contribution among small firm
employees is less than the premium contribution of large firm employees. However,
employees of small firms pay more for family coverage than do employees of
large firms (FIGURE 2). Although small firms are much more likely than large firms
to pay 100 percent of single and family premiums for their employees, they also
are slightly more likely to pay less than 50 percent of single premiums and more
than twice as likely to pay less than 50 percent of family premiums for their
employees (FIGURE 3).
FIGURE 2. Employee Contribution to Single and Family Premium (dollars), by Firm Size, 2001
Average Annual Employee Premium Contribution
Firm Size (number of employees) SINGLE COVERAGE FAMILY COVERAGE
3–199 296 2,265
200–999 357 1,770
1,000–4,999 443 1,811
≥5,000 378 1,410
Source: KFF/HRET
FIGURE 3. Percent of Single and Family Premium Paid by Employer, by Firm Size, 2001*
Single Coverage Family Coverage
Percent of Premium Paid 
by Employer
<50 4 2 29 11
50–99 38 81 49 80
100 57 17 23 9
Source: KFF/HRET * Totals do not sum to 100 due to rounding.
PERCENT OF PERCENT OF PERCENT OF PERCENT OF
SMALL FIRMS LARGE FIRMS SMALL FIRMS LARGE FIRMS
(3–199 EMPLOYEES) (≥200 EMPLOYEES) (3–199 EMPLOYEES) (≥200 EMPLOYEES)
Small firms that offer health
benefits are similar to large firms
with respect to employee eligi-
bility, take-up, and coverage rates,
but their employees’ premium
contributions are lower for single
coverage and higher for family
coverage.
E
* 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey and 1996 Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey data are weighted to be nationally representative.
Source: Schone
** Wages are in 1996 dollars.
FIGURE 1. Offer Rates for Small Firms (<26 workers), by Wage Rate, 1987 and 1996*
Offer Rates (percent of firms)
Wage Rate** 1987 1996 
Low Wage (<$7 per hour) 29 33
Middle Wage ($7–15 per hour) 61 66
High Wage (>$15 per hour) 72 85
Small and large firms that offer insurance cover about the same percentage of
workers; the share of employees who are eligible for health insurance differs by
only five percentage points; and the take-up rate is virtually the same (FIGURE 4).
Long and Marquis speculated that “one likely factor behind the greater change 
in coverage decisions by small employers is exposure to greater variability in
prices”(17). Indeed, a RWJF survey showed that small firms are much more likely
to experience premium volatility. In 1997, over one-third of small firms reported
annual premium changes greater than 10 percent, compared to only 19 percent
of large firms (17). (Of small firms, three times as many reported premium increases
as decreases.) In a survey of small employers, Morrisey found that “uncertainty in
premium costs” was an important reason cited for not offering health insurance
(19). Cutler found that premium variance is negatively related to the percentage
of high-wage employees and positively related to a firm’s turnover rate (4, 20).
Q3: ARE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE HIGHER FOR SMALL FIRMS?
Administrative costs for insurers include those associated with billing, claims 
payment, enrollment, risk charges, underwriting, overhead, commissions, premium
taxes, and profit. Per capita costs are probably lower for some of these categories
in large firms because of economies of scale. That is, an insurer would find it less
costly to sell coverage to one firm with 10,000 workers than to 200 separate firms
with 50 workers each. Not only are direct transactions costs and commissions
lower on a per capita basis, but large firms also are more likely to have their own
personnel and legal departments to handle benefits and compliance issues. Large
firms also are more likely than small firms to be self-insured, and hence to be
exempt from premium taxes because of their ERISA status. Although reasonable
(and, to many, convincing) arguments can be made about why administrative costs
are higher for small firms, little empirical evidence exists to support this belief.
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Premium volatility is greater in
small firms and can affect their
decisions to offer coverage.
E
FIGURE 4. Employee Eligibility, Take-up, and Coverage Rates (percent), Among Firms Offering
Coverage, by Firm Size, 2001
Eligibility Rate Take-up Rate Coverage Rate
Small Firms
83 84 70
(3–199 employees)
Large Firms
78 83 66
(≥200 employees)
Source: KFF/HRET
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Perhaps the most widely cited estimates of administrative costs by firm size 
were published in a 1988 Committee Print entitled Cost and Effects of Extending
Health Insurance Coverage (3).6 Prepared in consultation with the Hay/Huggins
Company actuarial firm (now The Hay Group), those estimates indicated that, as 
a percentage of claims, the administrative costs of the smallest firms were almost
eight times as high as the administrative costs of the largest firms (FIGURE 5).
These estimates reflected an actuary’s practical experience with various insurers,
not empirical research. Although still cited today, they are often criticized as
lacking empirical rigor; being grounded, largely, in pre-managed care experience;
and overstating administrative costs for “micro” firms. 
Other estimates in the fairly dated and limited literature show the same general
relationship, although the methods and basis of comparison (claims versus 
premiums) differ from study to study. GAO’s 2001 analysis indicates that small
firms pay about 20–25 percent of premiums for administrative costs compared 
to about 10 percent for large employers (9). Based on 1991 survey data, the Health
Insurance Association of America (HIAA) concluded that administrative costs for
mid-size employers (100–499 employees) were 14 percent of premiums, but for
small firms (<25 employees), administrative costs were 25 percent of premiums.7,8
In the late 1990s, Mark Hall conducted an extensive case study involving interviews
in seven states and reported that independent agents’ commission rates (one
component of administrative costs) for small groups were typically two to three
times higher than for large groups (11).
E
6. A Committee Print is a research report commissioned by one or more Congressional Committees.
7. We have not evaluated the methodological criteria used in the GAO or HIAA reports. 
8. Health Insurance Association of America, 2000. Why Do Health Insurance Premiums Rise? See also Marder,
William. 1993. Administrative Costs and the Debate about U.S. Health System Reform: A Review of the Literature.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Abt Associates, Inc. 
Actuarial estimates indicate 
that administrative costs are
higher for small firms but 
the size of the difference is
unknown.
FIGURE 5. Estimates of Administrative Costs, by Firm Size, 1988
Firm Size Total Administrative Costs
(NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES) (AS A PERCENT OF INCURRED CLAIMS)
1–4 40.0
5–9 35.0
10–19 30.0
20–49 25.0
50–99 18.0
100 –499 16.0
500 –2,499 12.0
2,500–9,999 8.0
≥10,000 5.5
Source: House Committee on Education and Labor, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Special Committee on Aging
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Mandated benefits have a 
disproportionate effect on 
small firms.
The strongest available 
research shows that existing
benefit mandates do not 
substantially increase costs 
or reduce coverage.
E
E
9. BlueCross BlueShield Association. 2001. State Legislative Health Care and Insurance Issues. 2001 Survey of Plans.
In addition, states have passed 77 laws that require choice of benefits, 37 laws that require choice of providers,
and three laws that require choice of persons covered. These are “optional rider” mandates. An enrollee can
purchase such coverage but it is not built into the benefit package and premium as a matter of fact.
10. In 2001, 21 percent of covered workers in small firms were enrolled in partly or completely self-insured plans, 
as compared to 60 percent of covered workers in jumbo (≥5,000 employees) firms. See KFF/HRET: 2001 Annual
Survey, p.132.
11. Gruber notes that waivers are limited to firms with less than 25 employees and firms who did not offer insurance
for the previous year.
Q4: DO BENEFITS MANDATED BY STATES INCREASE INSURANCE COSTS FOR SMALL FIRMS? 
All states require health insurers to cover certain benefits (e.g., screening for
chronic illnesses, mental health and substance abuse treatment, in vitro fertilization),
but these benefit mandates vary substantially from state to state. Many states
also require health insurers to include certain providers in their networks (e.g.,
nurse anesthetists or chiropractors), or to cover certain persons (e.g., adopted
children, dependent students). All states require immediate coverage of newborns.
This synthesis is limited to the literature on benefit mandates.
The number of mandates has soared since 1970, when the total in all states was
only 35 (15). The BlueCross BlueShield Association reports in its 2001 Survey of Plans
that between them, states had a total of 690 benefit mandates in place, as well
as 423 provider mandates and 241 “person covered” mandates.9
Because most large firms are self-insured, they are exempt from state benefit
mandates by virtue of their ERISA status. However, most small firms do not 
self-insure and are generally required to comply with state mandates.10 Benefit
mandates may raise premiums and, in turn, affect small firms’ decisions to 
offer coverage.
Referring to the potential for benefit mandates to drive small employers out of
the insurance market, Gruber has observed that “the magnitude of this ‘displace-
ment effect’… is at the crux of the policy debate over mandated benefits…Losing
all insurance coverage could have much larger consequences for the individual,
and society, than gaining coverage for a specific benefit”(10).
Several researchers have studied the effects of mandated benefits on the costs
of insurance (FIGURE 6). Among them, only Gruber concluded that benefit mandates
did not add substantially to the cost of insurance. His is also the only study that
satisfactorily addresses a number of major methodological concerns. Gruber
examined 12 states with laws that waived mandates for some small firms,11 and
found that health insurance coverage rose by less than two percent. More to the
point, he conducted a series of analyses and failed to find statistically significant
reductions in coverage due to mandates for firms with fewer than 100 employees.
Reasoning that any effects of mandates on coverage would be strongest among
very small employers, he then demonstrated the same finding (no relationship
between mandates and reductions in coverage) among firms with fewer than
25 employees. 
Sloan and
Conover
(1998)
March CPS, 1989–1994 Did the number of man-
dates enacted decrease
the probability that an
individual had employer-
sponsored insurance?
Between one-fifth to one-fourth of the
uninsured can be attributed to benefit
mandates.
Benefit mandate-exempt plans did not
increase coverage.
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Other authors have produced different findings. Some found that mandated
benefits raised the cost of insurance. Others found that mandates reduced 
coverage or the likelihood of coverage (FIGURE 6 AND APPENDIX II).
While these authors found greater effects than Gruber, their studies were method-
ologically weaker—relying on nonrepresentative samples, omitting important
variables, or failing to assess causality (APPENDIX II). Thus, although the argument
that mandates raise premiums has logical appeal, the evidence to date is not
compelling. It should be noted, however, that almost a decade has passed since
Gruber’s analysis and the number of enacted benefit mandates has greatly
increased since the early 1990s, when he conducted his research. There may be 
a threshold at which additional mandated benefits increase premium costs for
small firms, but the best available evidence suggests it had not been reached 
at the time of his study.
FIGURE 6. Effect of State Benefit Mandates on Health Insurance Costs and Coverage: 
Summary of Selected Literature
Source Data Used Research Questions Summary of Major Findings
Sources: Gabel and Jensen, Jensen and Gabel, Gruber, GAO, Sloan and Conover
Gabel 
and Jensen
(1989)
Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) Employee Benefits 
Survey, 1981–1984
National Federation of
Independent Business
(NFIB) mail survey, 1985
Do mandates add to the
price of insurance?
Are small firms less 
likely to offer insurance
in states with more 
mandates?
Each new mandate enacted between
1982 and 1985 lowered the likelihood
that a small firm would offer coverage
by 1.5 percent.
Jensen 
and Gabel
(1992)
NFIB mail survey, 1985
HIAA telephone survey,
1988
Are small firms less 
likely to offer insurance
in states with more 
mandates?
The 1985 survey showed that 19 
percent of sampled small firms did not
offer coverage due to state benefit
mandates.
The 1988 survey showed that 43 
percent of sampled small firms did not
offer coverage due to state benefit
mandates.
Gruber
(1994)
May Current Population
Survey (CPS) supplements,
1979, 1983, and 1988
March CPS, 1990 and 1992
What is the impact of 
mandates on the overall
rate of insurance?
Taken together, benefit mandates
reduced coverage by .3 percent to
1.3 percent. 
At most, state benefit mandate waiver
laws increased coverage by less than
2 percent.
GAO (1996) Interviews with National
Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC)
officials, state insurance
regulators, heath insur-
ance executives, benefit
managers, representatives
from trade associations,
and literature review
What are the costs 
associated with benefit
mandates?
The cost impact of state benefit 
mandates varied by state because all
mandates are not alike. Moreover, the
cost impact of a mandate is influenced
by implementation and enforcement
efforts. Finally, the extent to which a
mandated benefit was already covered
affects its cost impact.
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12. Tollen and Crane (23) observe that insurers selling to small firms (2–50 employees), whether in purchasing pools
or not, are subject to states’ small group reform laws (known as “rating bands”) which limit the extent of premium
variation based on specific factors such as age, geography, industry, and, in some cases, health status. A broader
rating band is more favorable to healthier/younger groups because it allows their rates to more fully reflect their
lower risk. A narrower rating band is more favorable to sicker groups because it limits the extent to which their
rates reflect their higher risk. As a result, if insurers inside the pool used a narrower rating band than insurers
outside the pool, healthier groups would leave the pool because they could get lower rates in the outside market,
and sicker groups would join the pool because they would face higher rates in the outside market. Therefore,
in the current regulatory environment, large size may be a necessary but insufficient condition for cooperatives
to lower costs for small employers.
Q5: HAVE PURCHASING POOLS REDUCED SMALL FIRMS’ PREMIUM COSTS?
Pooling small firms into purchasing cooperatives is a much-debated strategy to
reduce premium costs. Ideally, the objective of such cooperatives is “to enable
small groups to purchase insurance with the same administrative efficiencies and
bargaining power that large groups can achieve” and to gain other purchasing
advantages related to large size (1). But observers disagree about whether pooling
arrangements can meet these objectives. Some believe it will always be cheaper
to sell to one large employer than to many small employers, even if the latter
form a collective. Others believe that under the right conditions, small employer
purchasing pools can achieve economies of scale in administration, reduce claims
variation, and exert the same degree of power in negotiations with health plans
as large employers. As yet, no cooperatives have achieved such outcomes.
Wicks found that about 20 cooperatives have been established since states
passed enabling legislation, but none has made health insurance cheaper for
small employers than it would otherwise be or attracted substantial employer
enrollment (24). He argues that no purchasing pool has grown large enough to
measure the extent to which it may achieve these goals. Only one or two cooper-
atives have captured even five percent of the small group market. At its highest
enrollment, the California small employer collective purchasing arrangement
enrolled 150,000 workers. Florida’s peaked at 92,000 workers. Wicks concluded that
“there is nothing much wrong with [cooperatives]…that having larger market
share would not cure. Their biggest barrier to success is not being big” (24).
One way to reach a critical mass would be to require all small employers who
choose to offer insurance to participate in large pools. Those pools would then
have significant negotiating power to set prices, especially if they could selec-
tively contract with insurers (i.e., if they were not required to contract with “any
willing insurer”). If an insurer refused to sell coverage at an established price or
to comply with other contract requirements, the pool could prevent the insurer
from doing business in the small group market. To date, there has been neither
the popular nor political will to impose such a mandate.
It should be noted, however, that the debate about purchasing pools is not purely
one about size. No matter how large a cooperative of small firms may grow, under
current law it operates within a regulatory context that is different from that
experienced by most large firms. State insurance laws regulate small firms, whereas
most large firms are preempted from state regulation by virtue of self-insurance
and federal ERISA law.12 As long as this state of affairs holds, then the regulatory
context in which most small firms operate limits the extent to which they can 
Cycling in and out of the 
insurance market is more 
prevalent among small firms 
and may contribute to higher
administrative costs.
E
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collectively act (i.e., obtain lower premium prices) like large firms. However, small
group market dynamics could change significantly if federal law extended pre-
emption from state laws to insurance products sold inside cooperatives (but not
to such products sold outside cooperatives.) Congress has debated legislation that
would create an uneven regulatory context inside and outside cooperatives for
years. Advocates believe such legislation would enable cooperatives to purchase
less expensive insurance, lead to greater consumer choice, and reduce the number
of uninsured. Opponents believe such an “uneven playing field” would lead 
to market segmentation and destabilization (as described in footnote 12) and
ultimately render insurance least affordable to those who need it most. 
Other barriers to cooperatives’ success have included limited marketing (16, 24, 25),
the lack of participation by agents and brokers (11), and poor relationships with
health plans (24). Wicks questions whether the initial cooperative concept might
be somewhat flawed. Advocates of cooperatives may have overestimated the
administrative cost savings, underestimated the impact of small group reforms in
reducing pressure for cooperative-type solutions, and (like most others) failed to
anticipate the smaller increases in premiums that occurred during the mid 1990s (24).
Q6: WHAT OTHER FACTORS MIGHT DRIVE UP PREMIUMS FOR SMALL FIRMS RELATIVE TO 
LARGE FIRMS?
The cycling of firms in and out of the health insurance market, firm failure, and
frequent turnover of employees are factors that tend to drive insurance costs
higher for small firms.
According to Long and Marquis, “instability in offering insurance is much greater
among smaller employers than larger ones” (17). Using data from the 1997 RWJF
Employer Health Insurance Survey, they found that 22 percent of the smallest
firms (≤10 employees) that offered coverage two years prior to the survey did
not continue to offer coverage at the time of the survey. In contrast, among
employers of 100 or more, only four percent no longer offered coverage. The
authors concluded that increased cycling results in higher administrative costs for
small firms, as signing up a small firm involves considerable initial marketing and
service costs. If the employer leaves the insurer soon after enrolling—either
because the firm drops coverage or goes out of business—the fixed start-up
costs must be recouped in a shorter time. 
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Empirical research consistently shows that labor turns over faster in small firms
than in large firms. Nichols reviewed numerous empirical studies and concluded
that “the preponderance of evidence supports the claim that [employee] turnover
is greater among small firms than large”(20). He also concluded that firms with
rapid employee turnover might experience higher administrative costs of health
insurance from enrolling and disenrolling employees and from repeatedly
underwriting new employees.
A second type of turnover occurs when firms themselves fail. The failure rate
among small firms is substantially higher than for large firms. One study, which
excluded “firms” with payroll below $2,500, examined four-year survival chances
(from 1982–1986). It found a 17 percent failure rate for small firms (1–4 workers),
a 12 percent failure rate for firms with five to nine workers, and a three percent
failure rate for firms with over 50 workers (20). Nichols interpreted this evidence
to suggest that “smaller firms have some objective reason to be more cautious
than larger firms about making quasi-fixed expense commitments like health
insurance coverage for workers”.
Failure of small firms and
turnover of their employees 
creates instability—and greater
risk uncertainty—for insurers.
E
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
A key finding in this synthesis is that cost is a barrier 
for some but not all small employers. High-wage small
firms are about as likely as large firms to offer coverage. 
Therefore, a policy intervention to increase offer rates
among small firms might focus on those that are pre-
dominantly low-wage. 
Any policy intervention will probably be successful in 
lowering small firms’ health insurance costs to the degree
that it reduces or offsets any of the following character-
istics they tend to share:
• Higher administrative costs,
• Premium variability due to medical underwriting,
• Cycling in and out of the market,
• Relatively high firm failure, and
• Relatively high employee turnover.
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experiences more premium variability)
than the large group market. Cycling
in and out of the market in response
to the need for medical services con-
tributes to instability in the small group
market. Adding to this instability, small
firms and employees of small firms
turn over faster than large firms and
their employees. Taken together, these
factors tend to drive up health insur-
ance costs for small firms. 
High-wage small firms are about as
likely to offer coverage as large firms.
But, low-wage small firms are much
less likely to provide health coverage.
When small firms offer coverage, 
they are like large firms with respect
to the percentage of workers eligible
for health insurance (eligibility rate);
the percentage of eligible workers
that get insurance from their employer
(take-up rate); and the percentage of
workers covered by health insurance
(coverage rate).
Notwithstanding these similarities,
employees’ contributions to premiums
differ by firm size. For single coverage,
small firm employees contribute less on
average to premiums than employees
of large firms. Conversely, for family
coverage, small firm employees con-
tribute more on average to premiums
than employees of large firms.
High premiums are the primary reason
small employers cite for not offering
insurance coverage. Interventions 
to reduce health care costs for small
employers have been attempted, with
disappointing results. Reducing state
benefit mandates does not appreciably
reduce the cost of insurance for 
small firms. (However, the evidence
supporting this conclusion is somewhat
dated, as the best study was published
in 1994 using data from 1992.) Current,
high-quality research is needed to
keep pace with the rapid rise in bene-
fit, provider, and eligibility mandates
enacted by the states. Purchasing pools
might reduce small firms costs some-
what, but none has achieved sufficient
scale to be adequately evaluated.
We know that when small firms 
offer coverage, their premiums are,
on average, similar to those of large
firms. However, this is not an “apples-
to-apples” comparison because the
benefit packages offered by small
firms typically are less generous than
those offered by large firms.
Moreover, whereas almost all large
firms offer insurance coverage, 35
percent of small firms do not. There 
is reason to believe that health insur-
ance is more costly for those firms
that do not offer coverage. 
Also, even though small and large
firms that offer coverage have similar
premiums, small firms experience
greater premium variation due to
medical underwriting (which is more
common in the small group market).
Although small and large firms that
offer coverage have similar average
premiums, small firms generally pay
more for the same benefits package.
Why? First, they don’t benefit from
the same economies of scale as large
firms. A larger share of the small firm’s
premium is spent on administrative
costs. Second, the health insurance
market for small firms is less stable (i.e.,
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QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Research areas in need of further
investigation include:
Premium Differences
• What is the difference in average
health insurance premiums between
small and large firms when the data
incorporate: a) the premium costs
faced by small firms not offering
coverage, and b) a standard benefit
package? 
• What are the interrelationships
among small firm size, wage levels,
health status, and health insurance
costs?
Administrative Costs
• How do administrative costs, and
their components, vary by firm size?
Healthcare Purchasing Cooperatives
• What is the effect of pooling
(through purchasing cooperatives)
on administrative costs?
• Can cooperatives with a specific
number of participating employees
experience the same premiums as
single employers with the same
number of employees?
• How have state laws affected the
formation of purchasing pools?
State Mandates
• Should adoption and enforcement
considerations be factored into
measures of state mandates?
• What is the impact of benefit 
mandates on premiums? 
Firm Characteristics
• How much of the premium differ-
ences between small and large firms
are due to such firm characteristics
as health status, churning in and out
of the market, premium volatility,
employee turnover, firm failure, and
medical underwriting?
THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
The evidence base for this topic is relatively weak and better empirical work is
needed to answer almost all of the major questions raised. In particular, employer
surveys assessing health insurance costs should be based on more representative
samples; use clearer, agreed-upon definitions of administrative costs; and include
firms that do not offer coverage. Although available studies ask important policy
questions, they often fall short of providing needed information because they
omit critical analytic variables (which, it must be granted, can be difficult if not
impossible to collect). 
Improvements in measurement 
and model specification are needed. 
Problems related to variable definition
have clearly weakened studies on
benefit mandates—which, for exam-
ple, often use total cost of benefits
provided rather than the marginal cost
of an additional benefit to measure
their impact. This synthesis has shown
that the core question of how health
insurance costs vary by firm size cannot
be answered unless researchers and
decisionmakers look beyond simple
price comparisons among firms to dif-
ferences in covered benefits and pre-
mium variation within firms over time
and between firms at a point in time.
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The gold standard study of the effect
of state benefit mandates on health
insurance price and coverage has not
yet been conducted, but Gruber’s
1994 article stands out as the least
flawed. An important strength of his
analyses is the use of so-called “fixed
effects.” He avoided omitting impor-
tant explanatory factors by including
state and year variables that served 
as proxies for omitted but relevant
determinants of insurance coverage.
Sloan and Conover used the same
approach, but their methodology 
raises other concerns.
The shortcomings of the benefit 
mandate literature fall into four cate-
gories: 1) unrepresentative samples,
creating generalizability problems;
2) incompletely specified models (i.e.,
important variables are omitted);
3) counting the effect of a mandate
as the total cost of claims submitted
for the benefit, which will overcount
costs if the benefit was covered to
any degree prior to the mandate; and,
4) using the number of mandates a
state has enacted, or the average
number across all states, to estimate
the effect of mandates, rather than
evaluating the differential effect of
different mandates. 
The studies reviewed here revealed
some of these shortcomings (FIGURE 7).
While other authors’ studies were
affected by some of these method-
ological shortcomings, Gruber’s work
avoided the four mentioned above.
Moreover, he “replicated” his findings
for firms under 100 employees with a
separate analysis of firms with less than
25 employees, focused on five man-
dates accounting for about 50 percent
of mandate costs, and conducted a
“reverse experiment” in 12 states with
mandate waivers in which he found
an increase of coverage of less than
two percent.
APPENDIX II: SHORTCOMINGS OF BENEFIT MANDATE STUDIES
FIGURE 7. Shortcomings of Benefit Mandate Studies
Number of
Unrepre- Overcounting Mandates as Type of Mandate(s) 
sentative Incomplete the Cost of Explanatory Examined
Samples Models Mandates* Variable (BENEFIT, PROVIDER, COVERAGE)
Gabel and Jensen (1989) X X Benefit
Jensen and Gabel (1992) X X Benefit, Coverage**
Sloan and Conover (1998) X Benefit, perhaps others
Gruber (1994) Benefit
* Although overcounting the cost of mandates is not a shortcoming of the 
studies listed here, it is a limitation found in the larger body of research 
reviewed and thus is listed here.
Source: Author
** Coverage mandate: continuation of coverage 
for terminated or laid off workers.
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